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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we have recognized that the relatively constant inequal­
ity in the distribution of U.S. family income masks dramatic changes in the 
structure of the income distribution and the composition of personal incomes. 
Using relatively new procedures for decomposing the Gini measure of income in­
equality, we have gained a better understanding of the relationships among 
changes in the sources of income and the income distribution. This is facili­
tated through the use of data collected by the Census Bureau in the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, which is the only set of data currently 
available that contains exhaustive lists of income and asset information at 
the household level. The empirical results are used in conjunction with data 
on transfer program expenditures to gain some perspective on the relative 
costs of reducing income inequality by increasing program benefits.
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THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCING U.S. INCOME
INEQUALITY THROUGH INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS
The relatively constant inequality of the distribution of U.S. 
family income since World War II masks dramatic changes in the structure 
of the income distribution and the composition of personal incomes over 
the same period. It also obscures the fact that changes in sources of 
income may affect changes in overall income inequality quite differently 
and alter the positions of various socioeconomic groups along the 
distribution. Gaining a better understanding of the relationships among 
changes in the sources of income and the income distribution, income 
inequality, and the well being of various socioeconomic groups is 
important for informing public policy. A methodology for understanding 
such relationships is developed and calibrated in the research reported in 
this bulletin. The empirical results are used in conjunction with data on 
transfer program expenditures to gain some perspective on the relative 
costs of reducing income inequality by increasing program benefits.
BACKGROUND
Although the inequality in U.S. family income is large and has 
remained relatively constant over the post-war period, Levy (1987) argues 
that this period has been marked by three distinct trends. The drift 
toward equality through the late 1960's was followed by a drift away from 
equality through the 1970's, and a slightly sharper increase in inequality 
during the 1980's. This most recent trend is symptomatic of what some 
fear are fundamental changes in the economy leading to a vanishing middle 
class brought about by a decline in the number of middle-income manufac-
2turing jobs and the emergence of a two-tier job structure consisting of a 
few high-paying jobs and many low paying ones in a growing service sector.
The post-War period can also be divided into two distinct economic 
periods --a 27-year boom in which inflation-adjusted wages grew by sev­
eral percentage points per year and the period since 1973 in which real 
wages have stagnated (Levy, 1987). Despite the fact that this latter 
period is characterized by only a modest increase in overall income in­
equality, the stagnation in real wages has lead to major rearrangements in 
the structure of the distribution. Incomes of many elderly have risen, 
while those of younger families have moved down. A growing proportion of 
children are being raised in poverty. Regional income differentials have 
narrowed (Betson and Haveman, 1984), while city-suburban differentials 
have become larger.
The composition of incomes has changed dramatically as well. There 
are more households and families with more than one wage earner. More 
people, both young and old, rely on government transfer programs for a 
substantial portion of their income. Returns from property are also 
important components of income for many others. In 1960, for example, 
wages and salaries constituted 68 percent of total personal income in the 
United States; property and rental income was 15 percent of the total 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980). In that same year, dividends and 
interest, and transfer payments were 9 and 7 percent of the total, respec­
tively. By 1970, the first year of the drift toward increased inequality, 
there was little change. Wages and salaries constituted 66 percent of 
average total personal income. Property and rental income had fallen to 
just under 12 percent of the total, while dividends and interest, and
3transfer payments had risen to 11 and 10 percent of the total, respec­
tively (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987).
In 1986, the latest year for which data are available, the situation 
is quite different. Wages and salaries as a percentage of total personal 
income had fallen by 9 percentage points relative to 1960. Property and 
rental income constituted just under 9 percent of the total, while that 
attributed to dividends and interest rose to over 16 percent. The propor­
tion of income coming in the form of transfer payments was more than 
double the level for 1960 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987).
To begin to sort out the relationships between changes in the compo­
sition of personal income and total income inequality, the Gini coeffi­
cient, a measure of overall income inequality, is decomposed into the 
proportions due to the various major sources of income (Lerman and 
Yitzhaki, 1985). While this decomposition is not intended to explain the 
economic forces that gave rise to the changing composition, it is useful 
for describing how the distribution would change due to a marginal change 
in any major source of income. Such comparisons are more meaningful in a 
policy context than asking what happens to inequality by recalculating the 
Gini index after eliminating a particular source of income altogether.
To obtain deeper insights into the importance of income by source, a 
further (second level) method for decomposing the major sources into their 
respective component parts is designed. Special attention is also given 
to an extended Gini index which can reflect increased social aversion to 
inequality. To accomplish these Gini decompositions and extensions, a 
special purpose FORTRAN program was written; the source code and the
program's documentation are contained in two appendices.
r
4The data used in the analysis are from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP). This data set, the result of a major new 
effort by the Census Bureau, contains comprehensive income and asset 
information and is ideal for purposes of this analysis, which is an 
initial step in a more comprehensive research program designed to 
construct a framework for evaluating the effects of policy changes in 
transfer programs on the incidence of poverty in rural America and on the 
rural-urban poverty gap.
The remainder of this report begins with a general discussion of 
inequality measurement and a summary of the algebra of the first and 
second levels of decomposition. This is followed by a description of the 
data and a discussion of some summary statistics. The results of the 
decomposition are then followed by a discussion of the budgetary implica­
tions of reducing income inequality through Federal transfer programs. 
Finally, a statement of the major conclusions and policy implications is 
provided.
MEASURING INEQUALITY
The Gini coefficient, usually defined as the ratio of the area be­
tween the Lorenz curve (which represents the fraction of total income
possessed by the holders of the smallest p ^  fraction of income) and the
area under a 45° line (Gastwirth, 1972), has been one of the most widely
used measures of inequality in economic analysis. As such, it has been
the subject of much criticism as well, the most serious being that for 
income distributions with the same mean, it is impossible to find an 
additive social-welfare function that ranks distributions by their Gini 
coefficients (Chipman, 1985). This type of criticism can be levelled at 
most rankings based on only two parameters of the distribution; and at a
5theoretical level, what is needed is a multivariate measure that accounts 
for the heterogeneity of contemporary populations.
Despite this criticism, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and others argue 
that the Gini index remains an important tool for examining income distri­
bution. Their argument is based on the facts that: a) Gini measures and 
the mean permit one to form the necessary conditions for stochastic domi­
nance, b) an extended Gini index can be used to reflect increasing social 
aversion to inequality in much the same way as Atkinson's (1970) index of 
inequality, c) both the Gini and the extended Gini can be decomposed, 
yielding an intuitive interpretation of the elements making up each 
source's contribution to inequality, and d) the decomposition allows one 
to examine the marginal change in income by source on overall inequality.
This latter point is particularly attractive because despite one's 
inability to find additive social welfare functions consistent with a 
"mean-Gini" ranking, more general multivariate formulations still lead to 
social welfare functions whose partial derivatives are positive with 
respect to the mean and negative with respect to the Gini (Cumming, 1983, 
cited in Chipman, 1985). Thus, ceteris paribus, changes in any particular 
Gini coefficient due to marginal changes in income by source can be inter­
preted unambiguously.
Gini Ratio and Its Decomposition
Although the Gini coefficient is usually defined in relation to the 
Lorenz curve, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) demonstrate that it can also be 
derived directly from the formula for Gini's mean difference: 
b
(1) A -  J F(y) [l-F(y)]dy, 
a
6where y is income (a < y < b) and F(y) is the cumulative distribution. 
Through integration by parts and variable transformations, they show:
(2) A = 2 cov[y,F(y)].
The Gini index (G) is then formed by dividing A by mean income, p
In most applications, the Gini ratio is thought to be bounded by
zero and one. This is true only when all incomes are positive. However,
Gastwirth (1972) shows that the Gini ratio is still defined when some
incomes are negative but mean income remains positive. Then, the bounds
on the Gini range from 0 < G < (/*-a) (b-/i)//i(b-a) and comparisons across
populations become more difficult because the base is no longer unity.
Boisvert and Ranney (1990) provide a complete discussion of this issue,
but it should not be a problem in this application.
Letting y^,-..,y^ represent sources of income such that
y  ~  Y , yk > one can use the properties of the covariance of the sum of 
k
random variables (Mood et al., 1974) to write:
(3) A = 2 Y cov(yk ,F(y)).
k
Dividing (3) by and multiplying and dividing each component by 
cov(yk ,F(yk)) and /*k yields the Gini decomposition on total income:
(4) G =  Y  [cov(yk .F(y))/cov(yk ,F(yk) ] • [2 cov(yk ,F(yk)//ik ] • [Mk/A*y]
k
- X W k 'k
where Rk is the correlation between yk and the cumulative distribution of 
y, Gk is the Gini for yk , and Sk is yk 's share of y. Pyatt et al. (1980) 
prove that -1 < Rk < 1 and Rk takes on its extreme values when an income 
source is a decreasing (-1) or increasing (+1) function of total income 
and is zero if yk is a constant.
7To determine the change in inequality due to a marginal change in 
yk , Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) consider a change in each person's income 
from source k equal to ekyk where, ek is close to 1. Then, as proven by 
Stark et al. (1986), the partial derivative of (4) with respect to ek is:
(5) 3G/3ek - Sk(RkGk-G) 
and in elasticity terms:
(6) [3G/flek]/G - [SkGkRk/G]-Sk .
These elasticities sum to zero because a proportional increase in income 
from all sources would leave income inequality unaffected.
The Extended Gini Measure of Inequality
Yitzhaki (1983) derives an extension of the Gini index defined as:
(7) G(v) - 1 - v(v-l) J (1-F(y))v‘2 L(F(y))dF,
0
where L(F(y)) is the Lorenz curve. This extension includes a parameter v 
reflecting a relative social preference for equality. By changing v, one 
changes the weight attached to each point on the Lorenz curve. The weight 
is given by v(v-l)(1-F(y))v"2 = w. Values of v between zero and one 
reflect social aversion to equality; v-1 reflects equality neutrality and 
v > 1 indicates inequality aversion.
By differentiating w with respect to F(y),
(8) 3w/6F(y) = -v(v-1)(v-2)(l-F(y))v’3,
one can see that when v=2, the weights are independent of income rank.
This yields the standard Gini index where everyone is weighted equally.
For 1 < v < 2 and v > 2, the weights increase and decrease, respectively, 
as incomes ris.e. Thus, when v > 2, the index reflects relatively more
8social concern for those at the lower end of the income distribution.1 
The decomposition of the extended Gini G(v) is:
(9) G(v) - l Rk (v)Gk(v)Sk ,
k
where,
(10) Rk(v) = cov[yk(l-F(y))v'1]/cov[yk(l-F(yk))v '1] and
(11) Gk(v) - -v cov[yk ,(1-F(yk))v "1)]/pk .
Additional Levels of Decomposition
Further insights into the importance of income by source to total 
income inequality can be obtained through additional levels of decomposi­
tion. In their original study of the decomposition of income, Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985), for example, examined several major sources of income. 
These included wages, transfer payments and property income. However, as 
stated in the introduction, each of these sources can be decomposed as 
well. From a policy perspective, it may be as important to identify the 
effects of these components on the distribution of some major aggregates 
as it is to understand the effects of changes in these major components on 
total income inequality.
This can be accomplished through a second or even higher level of 
decomposition. In what follows, only a second-level decomposition is out­
lined. Higher levels of decomposition are a logical and obvious extension 
of this analysis. In developing the original decomposition, yk represents
l
Shalit and Yitzhaki (1987) show that in the case of discrete distribu­
tions with K observations, the rank of the observation, y^, less 0.5 
divided by K should be used as an estimator of the cumulative distribu­
tion F(y•): F(yi) = [Rank(yi) - 0.5]/K, and Z, = [(K +0.5 -
Rank(y^))/K]v" is an estimator of [1 - F(y^))]v" . In the FORTRAN code 
reported in Appendix B, this notion is generalised to accommodate grouped 
data.
9the source of income. Letting ykj be the j ^  component of the k**1
source of income, we can write yk - £ yk* ; and y - £ yk - £ £ yk* .
j k k j  J
In this case, k-l...K, and for each k, j - 1 ... Jk .
Once each source of income has been decomposed further into its 
several separate components, the second level of decomposition of the Gini 
measure of inequality is derived by recognizing that the Gini of income 
source k, the second term in brackets in equation (4), can be rewritten as
(12) 2 cov (yk , F(yk)//ik “
c°v (ykj , F(yk)) 
cov (ykj, F(ykj))
2 cov (ykj . F(ykj))
"kj
"kj
"k
Extending the notation used in equations (1) through (6) in an obvious 
way, one can substitute equation (12) into equation (4) and obtain
(13) G - l Rk [I RkJ Gkj SkJ]Sk .
k j
Thus, the Gini measure of income inequality for source k is the sum across 
the Jk components of source k of the products of the correlation between 
component j , ykj and the cumulative distribution of yk , the Gini of compo­
nent j and the component j's share of yk< A similar argument leads to a 
second-level decomposition of the extended Gini index.
By substituting equation (12) into equation (5), the partial deriva­
tive of (4) with respect to ek can be rewritten as:
(U) 8G/3«k - sk (Rkj [I Rkj Gkj Skj ] ■ l Rk [I Rkj GkJ StJ ] Sfc) .
1 k j
In the elasticity terms this becomes:
(15) [3G/3ek]/G = {Sk [£ Rkj Gkj Skj]/£ Rk tX Rkj Gkj Skj ]'Sk } " Sk ‘
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THE DATA
To accomplish the research objectives using this framework, we must 
gain access to household-level data which include detailed socio-economic 
data, as well as data describing participation in and the benefits derived 
from numerous transfer programs. Until quite recently, such a data set 
did not exist, but as Long et al. (1986) point out, the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), a major new effort conducted by the 
Census Bureau, has enormous potential. From the standpoint of this 
research, SIPP is the only data set currently available that contains 
exhaustive lists of income and asset information, both of which are essen­
tial for identifying income by source and for determining means-tested 
transfer program eligibility. In addition to earnings and self-employment 
income data for all adult members of a household, SIPP contains income 
data from a list of 56 sources, many of which are government programs, 
pension funds and other public and private sources. There is an asset 
list of 13 items from which income may be derived, as well as a list of 16 
special indicators (e.g. disabled, student loans, Medicare, etc.) which 
also are associated with income flowing to one or more members of a house­
hold (U.S. Dept, of Commerce, 1989; Long et al., 1986).
In addition to SIPP's wealth of socioeconomic data, the structure of 
the survey allows the researcher tremendous flexibility. SIPP is a multi- 
panel longitudinal survey of persons 15 years old or older. Data are also 
collected on all other persons who live with or move in with members of 
the original sample. One can obtain cross-sectional views of respondents 
at one point in time as well as longitudinal views of changes in economic 
circumstances and household composition over time.
11
For the first panel, the 1984 Panel (initiated in October 1983), a 
nationally-representative sample of households in the civilian non-insti- 
tutionalized population was selected and the adults in 19,878 households 
were interviewed. Subsequently, additional panels have been initiated in 
February of each calendar year. For persons selected into the first SIPP 
panel, monthly economic and demographic information were collected over a 
three-year period. The subsequent panels cover two years and eight 
months. The panels are divided into four nationally-representative sub­
samples or rotation groups. Each rotation group is interviewed in a sepa­
rate month with a complete cycle, or wave, completed after four months.
At every interview, questions are asked regarding each of the four months 
since the previous interview.2
For the analysis reported herein, we have chosen a cross-section 
from the fourth month of the third wave of the 1984 Panel. That is, we 
have abstracted data for the month prior to the month of the third wave 
interview. Depending on the rotation group, the data relate to the months 
of May, June, July, or August 1984. At that time, there were 18,941 
households interviewed.
SIPP's use of mutually exclusive panels also provides several advan­
tages for the long-term objectives of this research. It will ultimately 
accommodate the replication the decomposition of household income reported 
here for at least two points in time, three to four years apart. To the 
extent that general economic conditions have changed over this period, the 
effects of these changes on income inequality can then be isolated.
Although SIPP is close to an ideal set of data for examining income 
inequality by source and participation in transfer programs, the public
2 .For more information, see SIPP Users Guide (1987).
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use data, which heretofore have been generally available through the 
Poverty Institute at the University of Wisconsin, will in the future be 
accessible only through a public use work station at the Bureau of the 
Census. In order to meet our broader objectives of decomposing income 
inequality by source for two important geographic subsamples of house­
holds- -metropolitan and non-metropolitan, we have had to make special 
arrangements with the Bureau of the Census. Within the public use data, a 
special metropolitan subsample is identified, but, to guard against 
disclosure non-metropolitan households are identified only in the most 
populous states. Analyzing the behavior of non-metropolitan households 
from these states alone could generate an incorrect picture of inequality 
in rural areas and lead to inappropriate policy conclusions because house­
holds in predominantly rural states would be excluded. Therefore, in 
order to decompose income inequality in rural areas, we have gained the 
assistance of the Bureau of the Census in identifying a "rural" sample in 
such a way as to protect the confidential nature of the data. From this 
perspective, the analysis reported in this bulletin for the entire United 
States can be viewed as experimental and the first step in our plan toward 
a more complete understanding of the differences in income inequality by 
income source across metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. We hope to 
complete that work by Spring 1992.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results from the analysis of the decomposition of U.S. 
household income for 1984 are reported in several tables in this section; 
additional detail is provided in Appendix C. The five major sources into 
which income was decomposed include: a) earned income; b): property
income; c) transfer income; d) other money income; and’ e) non-money
13
income. The latter three sources were decomposed further into several 
categories which are delineated in table 1. The two important components 
of transfer income are Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and AFDC, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children. Social Security (SOC), State unemploy­
ment compensation, and veterans' benefits are the important components of 
other money income, while food stamps comprise the single most important 
component of non-money income.
Sample Averages
In the survey month in 1984 to which the data apply, average total 
household income in the United States was just under $2,178. On average, 
nearly $1,700 (or 78 percent) was in the form of earned income (table 1). 
Other money income was the second most important source, accounting for 
slightly over 14 percent of the total. Property income averaged $146 and 
was approximately 7 percent of the total, while transfer income was 1.1 
percent and non-money income was 0.5 percent of the total on average,3
Although not directly comparable, the composition of household 
income by major income source is generally consistent with the figures 
mentioned in the introduction. Any major differences are easily explained 
by how the various income sources were constructed. For example, the 
earned income category constructed from the SIPP data includes income from 
sources other than wages and salaries. Thus, it is not surprising that it 
accounts for three-quarters of mean household income. (Earned income in 
March 1981 from the Current Population Survey (CPS) as reported by Lerman
For both property income and other money income, there were a small 
number of negative observations. In general, these could lead to an 
underestimation of the income inequality, but in this case, the effect 
was insignificant. If it had been important, the income decomposition 
could have only been accomplished by simulating income changes (see ’ 
Boisvert and Ranney, 1990). \
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Table 1. Sources of Monthly Household Income For the United States, 1984
Source Mean3 Description
Earned Income $1,688
(77.5)°
Earnings from all sources (including self­
employment income) by all members of the 
household
Property Income 146
(6.7)
Property income from all people in the 
household
Transfer Income 25
(1.1)
Means tested cash transfers to all members 
of the household
SSI [33.9]c Supplemental Security Income from both 
Federal and state sources
AFDC [45.7] Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFD'G, ADC)
Other [20.4] General Assistance, Indian, Cuban, or 
Refugee Assistance and other welfare
Other Money Income 307
(14.1)
All other cash sources of income of all 
people in the household
soc [49.6] Social Security
Unemploy [3.5] State unemployment compensation, 
supplemental unemployment and other 
unemployment income
Vet [2.9] Veterans' benefits
Other [44.1] Other cash sources, including U.S. 
Government railroad retirement
Non-money Income 12
(0.5)
Dollar value of in-kind transfers (means 
tested) to all persons in the household
F. Stamps [76.8] Dollar value of food stamps
Other [23.2] Dollar value of energy assistance prograi 
and WIC (Women, Infants and Children 
Nutrition Program)
Source: SIPP.
aThe means are calculated for the survey month using expansion weights for 
the national sample; see the text for further explanation. Details may not 
add due to rounding.
^The numbers in parentheses are percentages of total income.
cThe numbers in brackets are percentages of the particular income source.
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and Yitzhaki, 1985, accounted for 82 percent of family income.) The 
transfer income category we constructed from the SIPP data is limited to 
the means-tested transfers, therefore, representing a significantly 
smaller fraction of household income than does the transfer category used 
by the Department of Commerce in the discussion above. Similarly, what is 
included in the Department of Commerce's definition of property income is 
distributed between our definition of property income and other money 
income, but in 1981, property income averaged 9 percent of the total 
according to the CPS data (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985).
To begin to get an appreciation for the nature of the distribution 
of income across households, it is instructive to look first at table 2. 
This table contains the Gini measures of inequality for total income, the 
five major sources of income and the several income categories within the 
major sources. The table also contains extended Gini measures for one 
value of v reflecting preference toward inequality (v = 0.5) and one value 
(v = 5.0) reflecting substantial aversion to inequality.* The differences 
in the Gini measures are as one might expect, so the discussion focuses on 
the decomposition of the conventional measure. Detailed information on 
the decomposition of total income for the extended Gini measures is in 
Appendix C.
According to the Gini measure, inequality of total income in the 
survey month is 0.41, a figure similar to that for annual family income 
over the past several decades as reported by Levy (1987) . Although the
As suggested by Yitzhaki (1983) , a value of v between zero and unity 
reflects a preference for inequality, while a value of v equal to unity 
reflects indifference to inequality and values above unity reflect 
increasing aversion to inequality. The conventional Gini is equivalent 
to the extended measure for v = 2.0.
Table 2. Rank Correlations and Gini Ratios For U.S Household Income by Income Source, 1984
Income
Source
v = 2.0 v = 1..5 ' v = 5,.0
Correlation 
with Rank of 
Total Income
[Rk(v>]
Gini of
Source
EGk(v)]
Correlation 
with Rank of 
Total Income
[Rk(v)]
Gini of
Source
[Gk(v)]
Correlation 
with Rank of 
Total Income
tRk(v)]
Gini of
Source
[Gk(v>]
Earned 0.900 0.547 0.902 0.360 0.907 0.900
Property 0.545 0.892 0.502 0.695 0.673 1.081
Transfer -0.434 0.948 -0.295 0.783 -0.948 1.000
SSI -0.418 0.979 -0.260 0.861 -1.076 1.000
AFDC -0.473 0.977 -0.309 0.855 -0.940 1.000
Other -0.306 0.987 -0.190 0.891 -0.753 1.000
Other Money 0.063 0.761 0.062 0.541 0.175 0.991
Soc -0.186 0.801 -0.166 0.569 -0.169 0.997
Unemploy -0.075 0.983 -0.068 0.875 0.071 1.000
Vet -0.005 0.982 -0.009 0.876 0.037 1.000
Other -0.309 0.914 0.264 0.711 0.539 1.067
Non-money -0.590 0.946 -0.402 0.777 -1.288 1.000
F. Stamps -0.607 0.955 -0.405 0.797 -1.363 1.000
Other -0.502 0.970 -0.332 0.835 -1.034 1.000
Total 0.413 0.275 0.688
Note: See Table 1 for definitions of sources of income. The parameters v are for the extended
Gini measure of inequality in equations (7) through (11). If v — 2.0, then the extended Gini 
measure is equivalent to the conventional Gini measure given in equations (1) through (6).
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results from these two very different data sources are not directly compa­
rable, the similarity is reassuring for policy purposes. The primary 
reason for basing this analysis on SIPP monthly data is the detail it 
provides regarding income by source.
The Decomposition of Inequality
In analyzing the decomposition of income inequality, it is important 
to observe that each of the five major sources of income is more unequally 
distributed than is total income itself. The measure of inequality for 
earned income is 32 percent higher than it is for total income, while the 
Ginl coefficient for other money income is 84 percent higher. For the 
other three sources of income (property income, transfers, and non-money 
income), the Gini coefficient is close to or over 0.9, well over twice the 
figure for total income. This high degree of inequality in these three 
sources is explained in large part by the fact that in each case, many 
households receive none of their income from these sources.
Further insight into the interrelationships of inequality across 
sources of income can be obtained by examining the figures for the corre­
lation of each income source with the rank of total income (table 2) and 
how they enter the calculation of the Gini measure in equation (4). As 
long as these correlations are positive, but less than unity, the income 
source contributes to total income inequality but at a rate less than its 
own degree of inequality multiplied by its share of total income. In 
contrast, if the correlation with the rank of total income is negative, 
then the income source acts to reduce the level of inequality in total 
income. This latter situation is true for two major sources of income, 
transfers and non-money income, as well as for the five components within 
the categories.
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The rank correlations with total income are also negative for the 
four components of other money income-- Social Security, unemployment 
benefits, Veterans' benefits and other. Thus, these components of other 
money income actually reduce income inequality, but, in the aggregate this 
is not true because the rank correlation with total income of other money 
income is positive. These differences highlight the importance of 
detailed disaggregation in examining the policy significance of income 
components to overall income inequality.
Table 3 contains estimates of the proportional contribution of each 
income source to all other sources. It also presents the decomposition of 
each source's inequality by major component. By construction, each of the 
columns in the table (excluding the numbers in parentheses) add to unity. 
Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that 92 percent of the 
inequality in total income is explained by earned income. Property income 
also accounts for a significant portion, while the small contribution of 
other money income is just about offset by the negative contributions to 
the inequality of total income by transfers and non-money income. It may 
be fruitful to undertake further analysis of the data, decomposing earned 
and property income into their major components. A particularly useful 
extension of the results would be to decompose earning by primary and 
secondary earners and self-employment income.
By looking at table 3, one can also disentangle the reason for why 
the correlation between other money income and the rank of total income is 
positive but the correlations are negative for the individual components. 
The numbers in parentheses in the last column represent the proportional 
contribution of each of the categories to total income inequality and add 
to the proportional contributions of each corresponding major income
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Table 3. Proportional Contribution of One Income Source to the Inequality
of Another Income Source for U. S. Households, 1984 (v=2.0)
Income Source
Income Earned Property Transfer Other Money Non-Money Total
Source3 Income Income Income
Earned 1.000 0.923
Property 1.000 0.079
Transfer -0.011
SSI 0.337 (-0.004)b
AFDC 0.461 (-0.006)
Other 0.202 (-0.002)
Other Money 0.016
So c 0.466 (-0.025)
Unemploy 0.028 (-0.001)
Vet 0.023 (-0.000)
Other 0.483 (0.042)
Non-money -0.007
F. Stamps 0.772 (-0.006)
Other 0.228 (-0.001)
aSee table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11) . The proportional changes in inequality given in this table 
are calculated according to equation (6), with the extended values of R^(v) 
and G^(v) substituted for and when the value of v is not equal to 
2.0. The proportional changes for total income can be calculated from the 
individual proportions for the components using the second-level decomp­
osition described in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the proportional contributions of each 
corresponding income source. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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source. In the case of other money income, social security and unemploy­
ment, and veterans benefits all reduce inequality, but this reduction is 
more than offset by the "other" category of other money income.
For those income sources that are subdivided into several 
components, table 3 also provides estimates of their contribution to the 
inequality of each source. AFDC payments, for example, account for 
approximately 47 percent of the inequality in transfer income; SSI is the 
second most important component, accounting for nearly 34 percent of the 
inequality. For. other money income, Social Security and the "other" 
category are about equally important, each contributing just under 50 
percent of the inequality of this source. Food stamps account for over 
two-thirds of the inequality in non-money income.
Elasticities of Inequality
The discussion up to now has been instructive in understanding the 
contribution of various sources of income to overall income inequality. 
From a policy perspective, however, important information is obtained by 
the decomposition of the elasticities of inequality by source. For the 
conventional Gini, these elasticities are reported in table 4. As 
explained above, these elasticities (from equation (6)) reflect the change 
in total income inequality resulting from a marginal percentage change in 
income by source k for each household. (They must add to zero across all 
income sources because an equal percentage change in all sources for each 
household would leave inequality unchanged.) Broadly interpreted, these 
elasticities provide a first approximation to the change in inequality 
resulting from a general shift in the wage rate, a general change in the 
level of earnings from property or across the board increases or decreases
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Table 4. Elasticity of One Income Source to the Inequality of Another 
Income Source for U.S. Households, 1984 (v-2.0)
______________________Income Source_______________________
Income Earned Property Transfer Other Money Non-Money Total
Source® Income Income Income
Earned 0 0.148
Property 0 0.012
Transfer -0.023
SSI -0.002 (-0.008)
AFDC 0.004 (-0.011)
Other -0.002 (-0.004)
Other Money -0.124
Soc -0.030 (-0.095)
Unemploy -0.007 (-0.006)
Vet -0.006 (-0.004)
Other 0.042 (-0.020)
Non-money -0.013
F. Stamps 0.004 (-0.010)
Other -0.004 (-0.003)
®See table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11). The elasticities of inequality in the table are calculated 
according to equation (7), with the extended values of R^(v) and Gj^v) 
substituted for and when the value of v is not equal to 2.0. The 
elasticities for total income can be generated from the elasticities of 
the individual components using the second-level decomposition described 
in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the elasticities of each of the 
corresponding income sources. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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in means-tested transfer programs, Social Security, unemployment benefits 
or food stamps.
Perhaps the most striking result in table 4 is that all the 
elasticities are below 0.148 in absolute value. Thus, in general an 
across the board percentage change in any particular source of household 
income will lead to a much smaller percentage change in inequality of 
total income. This is probably a partial explanation for why measures of 
income inequality in the United States have remained relatively stable in 
spite of major changes in the levels of transfer program benefits and the 
structure of the economy.
Because the sum of the elasticities is zero, a number of the 
individual elasticities will be opposite in sign. As expected, across the 
board increases in either earned income or property income will lead to an 
increase in the inequality of total household income. The rate of the 
increase (0.148) for earned income is more than twelve times that for 
property income. These positive elasticities are in contrast to the 
negative ones for the other three sources. Increases in other money 
income would lead to the largest percentage decrease in total household 
income inequality, whereas increases in non-money sources of income would 
have the smallest relative decrease in total income inequality.
From a policy perspective, the elasticities of total income with 
respect to the individual components of these latter three sources are 
perhaps the most interesting. First, three-quarters of the elasticity 
associated with other money income is due to the Social Security compo­
nent. In absolute value, the effect of a general increase in Social 
Security benefits is approximately 64 percent as effective at reducing 
inequality as an increase in earned income is at increasing total income
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inequality. According to these elasticities, increases in Social Security 
are nearly ten times as effective at reducing income inequality than are 
increases in SSI,' AFDC and Food Stamps. However, in comparing the elas­
ticities across these major government transfer programs, it is important 
to remember that the households affected by the programs are quite differ­
ent, as are the budgetary costs of the changes as indicated in the section 
that follows. A complete evaluation of these changes would certainly 
require more information about program costs and final incidence of the 
benefits.
At the second level of decomposition, one also finds some 
interesting contrasts in the elasticities of inequality. For example, 
across the board increases in AFDC would lead to an increase in the 
inequality of transfer income, while increases in SSI and other transfer 
programs would have the opposite effect. To the extent that there is a 
group of low-income households that rely primarily on transfer income, the 
inequality of incomes for that group would be exacerbated by increases in 
AFDC benefits at the expense of other transfer programs. For the group of 
households relying mostly on other money income, an increase in Social 
Security benefits would clearly reduce the income inequality.
BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
While the elasticities of inequality reported above are important 
from a policy perspective, identifying which programs provide relatively 
low-cost reductions in inequality is even more important. For example, 
the elasticities of income inequality reported in table 4 suggest that a 
one percent increase in Social Security benefits would reduce inequality 
by 0.095 percent, more than any other of the major government programs 
covered by this analysis. Table 5 shows, however, that Social Security
Table 5. FY'84 Budgetary Implications of Reducing Inequality
ExDenditures on Benefits
Increases in Benefits Required to 
Reduce Ineaualitv bv One Percent 7
Total Federal States Total Federal States
SSI 10.21 8.1 2.1
$ billions - - - - 
12.8 10.2 2.6
AFDC 14.42 7.7 6.7 13.1 7.0 6.1
SOC 180.93 180.9 -- 19.0 19.0 - -
UNEMPLOY 16.34 3.0 13.3 27.2 5.0 22.2
VET 10.05 10.0 - - 25.0 25.0 - -
FOODSTAMPS 11.56 11.5 - - 11.5 11.5 - -
Sources: 1 Committee on Ways and Means, (1985), Table 9, p. 447. 2 Committee on Ways and Means, (1985), Table
13, p. 359. 3 Committee on Ways and Means, (1985), Summary Table 1, p. 3. 4 Committee on Ways and Means,
(1985), Table 1, p. 275. 5 Committee on Ways and Means, (1987) Derived from Table 9, p. 716 and text p. 715.
6 Committee on Ways and Means, (1987), Table 1, p. 494.
7 The calculations assume: (1) increasing benefits would not change who participates; (2) Federal and State
shares of benefits would remain constant; and (3) marginal effects on administrative costs would be zero.
The calculations utilize the elasticities (c) reported in the last column of Table 4 and one percent of the 
expenditures listed above in columns one, two and three as follows: cost of reducing inequality by one
percent = 1/e (cost of increasing benefits from source by one percent).
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also has the highest expenditures for benefits of any of those programs. 
More importantly, further investigation reveals that other programs would 
yield the same reduction in inequality more cost-effectively than would 
the Social Security program.
Total Federal and state expenditures on SSI, AFDC, Social Security, 
Unemployment Insurance, Veterans', and Food Stamp benefits for FY84 are 
delineated in table 5. For each program, total and jurisdictional 
budgetary implications of decreasing inequality by one percent also are 
reported. Five points stand out when evaluating these results.
The first is one that could be overlooked so it's an important point 
to emphasize at the outset. If the level of inequality is reduced through 
one of these policy measures, the added income is assumed to accrue only 
to current participants in a particular program. Thus, even though we are 
comparing equal reductions in inequality, the households whose incomes are 
improved will differ substantially. For example, increases in Social 
Security benefits will improve the lot of the elderly, many of whom are 
not "poor". Veteran's benefits may also be distributed across the 
socioeconomic spectrum, but for the younger veterans, there is probably 
some concentration among the low to lower middle income groups. Increas­
ing benefits under Unemployment Insurance and the means-tested programs 
for the low-income population will affect the truly disadvantaged, regard­
less of age etc. provided that they meet the participation requirements 
and choose to participate in the program.
Second, in some sense it is heartening that the three most cost- 
effective programs for decreasing income inequality are means-tested 
programs that specifically target the low income population, SSI, AFDC, 
and Food Stamps. A one percent decrease in income inequality through the
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Food Stamp program would require a budgetary increase of 11.5 billion 
dollars. To attain the same percentage reduction, SSI or AFDC benefits 
would have to be increased by 12.8 or 13.5 billion dollars, respectively. 
In contrast, a one percent reduction in inequality through increases in 
programs not targeted toward the low-income population, Social Security, 
Veterans', or Unemployment Insurance, would require 19.0, 25.0, or 27.2 
billion dollars, respectively.
The third point can be made by a closer examination of the cost- 
effectiveness of the means-tested programs. The Food Stamp Program is the 
least expensive, followed by SSI and AFDC, in turn. The Food Stamp 
program, however, is the only one of the three that has nationwide 
eligibility standards and benefit schedules. That is, families that are 
identical in terms of income, allowable deductions, and family composition 
receive identical food stamp allotments, wherever they reside. For SSI, 
Federal benefits are standard nationwide, although states may supplement 
those benefits. Thus, SSI benefits vary above a base level by state of 
residence. AFDC benefits, however are entirely determined by each state 
and exhibit wide variation. Thus, this regional variation in the benefits 
for these other programs would also mean that improvements in "welfare" 
from across the board percentage increases would be distributed unevenly 
by region as well.
Third, for this analysis, we have assumed that the state and Federal 
shares of total expenditures would remain constant. As indicated in the 
last two columns of table 5, a one-percent reduction in inequality from 
across the board increases in SSI, AFDC, or unemployment benefits would 
affect budgets at state and Federal levels. In the case of unemployment 
benefits, Federal expenditures would have to increase by $5.0 billion,
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while state expenditures would have to increase substantially, by $22.2 
billion. For AFDC the cost of increasing benefits would be split roughly 
in half between the Federal and state governments, $7.0 and $6.1 billion, 
respectively. For SSI, the states that do supplement Federal SSI benefits 
would have to be willing to raise them by $2.6 billion in addition to the 
Federal increase of $10.2 billion. The political feasibility of Federal- 
state cooperation in any of these endeavors is uncertain.
Finally, our analysis shows that the Food Stamp program may be the 
best candidate for reducing income inequality given that Federal-state 
cooperation is not needed and that the program is the most cost-effective 
of the programs studied here. A full one-percent reduction in inequality 
may not be politically feasible, however, because a doubling of food stamp 
benefits for current participants would be required. Such a doubling 
would give participants who receive the full monthly allotment of stamps a 
food budget larger than the Liberal plan, the high-end food budget 
designated by the USDA, rather than the low-end Thrifty plan. In April of 
1984, the monthly costs of food at home based on the Thrifty plan and the 
Liberal plan were $267.1 and $507.60, respectively, for a family of 4 
which included a couple between 20 and 50 years of age and children 
between the ages 6-8 and 9-11 years (Family Economic Review, 1984).
While a doubling of benefits may not be politically feasible, many 
have argued that an increase in Food Stamp benefits is needed, largely due 
to inadequacies in the assumptions underpinning the Thrifty plan (Ranney, 
1986). The analysis here suggests one more rationale for increasing Food 
Stamp program benefits: such increases are cost-effective means for
reducing income inequality.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have recognized that the relatively constant 
inequality in the distribution of U.S. family income masks dramatic 
changes in the structure of the income distribution and the composition of 
personal incomes. Using relatively new procedures for decomposing the 
Gini measure of income inequality, we have gained a better understanding 
of the relationships among changes in the sources of income and the income 
distribution. This is facilitated through the use data collected by the 
Census Bureau in the Survey of Income and Program Participation, which is 
the only set of data currently available that contains exhaustive lists of 
income and asset information at the household level.
Using the decomposition methods, we have been able to generate the 
contribution of each income source to overall income inequality, as well 
as the elasticities of inequality by income source. Additional insights 
regarding inequality are gained through a second-level decomposition by 
major sources of income. In particular, aggregate transfer income, money 
income other than earned and property income, and non-money income are 
decomposed further into several major Components. The empirical results 
are used in conjunction with data on transfer program expenditures to gain 
some perspective on the relative costs of reducing income inequality by 
increasing program benefits.
Given that each of the sources of income identified in this study is 
relied on to different degrees by households across the country's various 
socio-economic groups, it is not surprising that inequality for each 
income source is significantly higher than for total income, over twice as 
high for property income, other money income, and transfers. It is also 
not surprising to find that 92 percent of the inequality in total income
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is explained by earned income. Property income also accounts for a 
significant portion, while the small contribution of other money income is 
just about offset by the negative contributions to the inequality of total 
income by transfers and non-money income.
Perhaps the most striking empirical result is that all the 
elasticities are below 0.148 in absolute value. Thus, in general, an 
across the board percentage change in any particular source of household 
income will lead to a much smaller percentage change in the inequality of 
total income. This is undoubtedly the overriding explanation for why 
measures of income inequality in the United States have remained 
relatively stable in spite of major changes in the levels of transfer 
program benefits and the structure of the economy. Unfortunately, this 
means that it would be extremely difficult to seriously affect the 
magnitude of income inequality in this country through existing transfer 
programs at the Federal level. Despite this discouraging finding, it is 
important to point out that increasing transfer program benefits does move 
the income distribution in the right direction, although Social Security 
and programs like AFDC would affect quite different socio-economic groups. 
Fortunately, the three most cost-effective transfers are those that are 
means tested, specifically targeting the low-income population.
APPENDIX A
DOCUMENTATION OF A PROGRAM FOR DECOMPOSING 
THE GINI AND EXTENDED GINI MEASURES OF INEQUALITY
The purpose of this Appendix is to document a program to calculate 
the conventional Gini and extended Gini measures of income inequality and 
their decompositions by income source.1 This particular decomposition was 
first suggested by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) , and it is summarized by 
equations (1) through (6) in the text above. The program is designed to 
calculate the Gini and extended Gini measures of inequality by income 
source (equations (7) through (11)), as well as the Gini correlations be­
tween income component and total income and the elasticities of inequality 
by source. An important feature of the program is its ability to handle 
grouped or ungrouped data.2 The program, however, does not automatically 
calculate the two-level decomposition results. Those results can be easily 
obtained by several passes through the software.
This specialized routine for performing these calculations is written 
to circumvent the difficulties in calculating the cumulative frequencies by
Richard Boisvert developed and generalized the FORTRAN Code discussed in 
this Appendix. Paul Driscoll suggested the FORTRAN procedure for calcu­
lating the cumulative frequencies of each income source without reranking 
the data. His efforts are appreciated.
Initially, this program was designed to handle grouped data even when the 
size of the groups were reported as proportions of the sample rather than 
as the actual number of members of the group. However, this caused a 
number of problems because the calculations are based on the midpoints of 
the group intervals. Therefore, one needs to use the actual number of 
members of the group when using the program. The program is actually de­
signed to convert these data into integers so that this problem is 
avoided in the calculations.
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income source. The difficulties arise because incomes by source are not 
usually ranked consistently across all observations. Without such a rou­
tine one would have to create separate data sets to rank the data for these 
calculations and then have to merge them back into a single data set for 
the remainder of the calculations.
The program is written in FORTRAN and was compiled using the 
Microsoft FORTRAN compiler. Thus, the program is designed to run on an 
IBM-compatible microcomputer, but it would be an easy task to recompile the 
source code on a mainframe computer as well. At the present time, the code 
is designed to handle up to 5 income sources, up to 420 observations 
(either observations on single income earning unit or groups of units), and 
calculate extended Gini results for up to 10 different extended Gini 
weights. The program's capacity can be expanded easily by recompiling the 
program after simply resetting three parameter values.1
The remainder of this Appendix is organized into two short sections. 
The first illustrates how to use the program using a set of sample data, 
while the second section describes the results and explains the computer 
output.
The source code for the FORTRAN program is contained in Appendix B. The 
value of MAXI is used to specify the maximum number of individual obser­
vations or groups. The value of MAXJ is used to specify the maximum num­
ber of income sources, and the value of MAXV is used to specify the num­
ber of extended Gini weights. The program is currently written in double 
precision so there is currently limited capacity to increase the dimen­
sions of the program if it is to be run on a microcomputer. However, 
there is little need for the program to be written in double precision 
and it would be a relatively simple task to change it to single preci­
sion. This would involve a redeclaration of the real variables, the 
reinitialization of some variables from 0.0D0 to 0.0, and a change in the 
way in which some integer variables are set to real variables and vice 
versa. A simple search of the program for 0.0D0, INT, and DBLE would 
pick up these functions in the program.
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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE USING A SAMPLE DATA SET
In this section, a small hypothetical data set is used to illustrate 
the operation of this program. The data set includes three sources of in­
come and six groups. The program requires two input files. The first file 
is for a set of program parameters, including labels for the income 
sources. The data for this file are in Table A-l. The second file con­
tains the actual income data by source. The hypothetical data for this 
file are in Table A-2.2
Table A-l. Input Parameters for Extended Gini Example
"1 0 6 3
1.25 2.00 3.00
Source 1 
Source 2 
Source 3
Table A-2. Sample Income Data by Source, Year 1
Number Average Average Average Average
of Income Income Income Income
Farms Source Source Source Total
1 2 3
1849 729.584 54.083 2731.747 3515.414
617 1743.922 131.280 1847.650 3722.853
660 2895.455 218.182 1574.242 4687.879
497 4641.851 319.920 1257.545 6219.316
227 7370.044 488.987 1678.414 9537.445
113 15893.805 946.903 2176.991 19017.699
When running this program on a microcomputer, you will be prompted for 
two input files. The parameter input should be entered when unit 10 is 
requested; the income data file should be entered when unit 11 is re­
quested; and the output is written to unit 12.
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The Input Parameters
There are three basic types of input parameters. The first record in 
the input file containing these parameters has four entries. They are read 
in free format, that is, they can be placed anywhere in the record as long 
as each is separated by at least one space. The first entry is the number 
of income sources. The second entry is a 0 if total income is to be read 
as data; it is 1 if total income is to be calculated by summing the compo­
nents. The third entry contains the number of observations (or groups) for 
which the input data are to be printed; zero (which must be typed) is the 
default that will print the data for all the observations. The final entry 
on the first record is the number of weights for which the extended Gini 
measure of inequality is to be calculated. The second record contains the 
list of specific extended Gini parameters for which results are to be cal­
culated. The remaining records contain the names of the sources of income. 
The names are used as labels in the output of the program. One label is to 
appear on each record, listed in the same order as the income sources in 
the second input file.
The Income Data
The second input file (see Table A-2) contains the actual input data. 
The data for each observation or group are all in free format on a single 
record. The first entry in the record is the number of households (or 
other income earning units of observation) in the group. (In the case 
where the data are not grouped, this entry should be unity). This number 
is followed by the average incomes for each source for each group. In this
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example, total income is read as data; the average total income for units 
in a group is the last entry in each record.3
EXPLANATION OF THE OUTPUT
The output from the application of this program to the sample data is 
found in Table A-3. It is reasonably self-explanatory.
The first section of the output contains a print of the income input 
data. (In this case, data for all six groups are printed.) Income by 
source is followed by the empirically estimated cumulative frequency. The 
last three entries include the total income, its cumulative frequency, and 
the number of households in the group.*
The second section of the output contains the decomposition of the 
conventional Gini measure of inequality. (This is equivalent to the ex­
tended Gini results for an extended Gini parameter equal to 2.) The first 
part of this section includes mean income by source, income share by income 
source, and the covariances of income by source and the cumulative frequen­
cies of total income. The second part of this section contains the Gini 
ratios by source, the ratios of the covariances, the values for RGS (from
Since the program is written to continue to read data until the end of 
the file is encountered, there is no need to enter the number of observa­
tions (or groups) in the parameter input file mentioned above.
In calculating the cumulative frequencies, it is important that incomes 
for any of the groups are not equal, otherwise some of the cumulative 
frequencies will be calculated incorrectly. To circumvent this problem, 
incomes are incremented by a very small amount equal to 0.00000001 times 
the input record number. This has no effect on the result, but it avoids 
the problem of having the same cumulative frequency assigned to the in­
comes for a particular source for more than one group.
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Table A-3. Output from Extended Gini Program Data
INCOME BY: CUMFREQS: INCOME BY: CUMFREQS: INCOME BY: CUMFREQS:
Source 1 Source 1 Source 2 Source 2 Source 3 Source 3
729.58 .23341 54.08 .23341 2731.75 .98587
1743.92 .54454 131.28 .54454 1847.65 .47641
2895.46 .70565 218.18 .70565 1574.24 .22937
4641.85 .85163 319.92 .85163 1257.55 .06283
7370.04 .94297 488.99 .94297 1678.41 .32072
15893.81 .98587 946.90 .98587 2176.99 .51930
TOT. INCOME CUMFREQ NUMBER
3515.41 .23341 1849.00
3722.85 .54454 617.00
4687.88 .70565 660.00
6219.32 .85163 497.00
9537.45 .94297 227.00
19017.70 .98587 113.00
NAME MEAN INCOME INCOME SHARE COVARIANCE
Source 1 2551.602546 .524046 632.080513
Source 2 17-7.138450 .036381 41.266914
Source 3 2140.297704 .439573 213.823701
NAME GINI RATIO COVRATIOi RSG PROPOR ELASTICITY
Source 1 .495438 1.000000i .259633 1.196608 .672562
Source 2 .465928 1.000000 .016951 .078123 .041743
Source 3 .199807 -.678693 -.059610 -.274732 -.714304
TOTAL .216974
NUMBER OF EXTENDED GINI PARAMETERS = 3
ENTENDED GINI PARAMETER NO. 1 - 1.250
ENTENDED GINI PARAMETER NO. 2 = 2.000
ENTENDED GINI PARAMETER NO. 3 = 3.000
EXTENDED GINI WEIGHT 1.250000
NAME MEAN INCOME INCOME SHARE COVARIANCE
Source 1 2551.602546 .524046 -427.827858
Source 2 177.138450 .036381 -27.143027
Source 3 2140.297704 .439573 -164.013912
NAME GINI RATIO COVRATIO RSG PROPOR ELASTICITY
Source 1 .209588 1.000000 .109834 1..111513 .587467
Source 2 .191538 1.000000 .006968 .070519 .034138
Source 3 .095789 -.427190 -.017987 -..182032 -.621605
TOTAL .098815
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Table A-3. (Continued)
EXTENDED GINI WEIGHT 2.000000
NAME MEAN INCOME INCOME SHARE COVARIANCE
Source 1 2551.602546 .524046 -632.080513
Source 2 177.138450 .036381 -41.266914
Source 3 2140.297704 .439573 -213.823701
NAME GINI RATIO COVRATIO RSG PROPOR ELASTICITY
Source 1 .495438 1.000000 .259633 1..196608 .672562
Source 2 .465928 1.000000 .016951 .078123 .041743
Source 3 .199807 -.678693 -.059610 - ,.274732 -.714304
TOTAL .216974
EXTENDED GINI WEIGHT 3.000000
NAME MEAN INCOME INCOME SHARE COVARIANCE
Source 1 2551.602546 .524046 -513.946280
Source 2 177.138450 .036381 -34.171904
Source 3 2140.297704 .439573 -177.617984
NAME GINI RATIO COVRATIO RSG PROPOR ELASTICITY
Source 1 .604263 1.000000 .316662 1.265580 .741534
Source 2 .578732 1.000000 .021055 .084147 .047767
Source 3 .248963 -.799597 -.087506 - .349728 -.789301
TOTAL .250211
equation (4)), and the proportions and elasticities of inequality by source 
from equations (5) and (6), respectively).
The next section of the output reports the number of extended Gini 
parameters for which extended Gini results are reported, and lists the val­
ues of the parameters. This is followed by the final section of the output 
containing the extended Gini results for each of these parameter values.
The output in this section is identical to that for the conventional Gini, 
only the calculations are based on equations (7) through (11).
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APPENDIX B
C PROGRAM INDECOMP
C
C WRITTEN BY: RICHARD N. BOISVERT
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
DATE: MARCH 1, 1991
LANGUAGE: FORTRAN-- IBM COMPATIBLE
PURPOSE: ‘
TO CALCULATE GINI RATIOS FOR INCOME AND ITS DECOMPOSITION 
OF INCOME INEQUALITY BY SOURCE AS DEVELOPED BY LERMAN AND YITZHAKI
DOCUMENTATION:
THE PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY DIMENSIONED TO HANDLE 420 GROUPED 
OBSERVATIONS ON 5 INCOME SOURCES, ALTHOUGH THE CODE IS DESIGNED TO 
WORK WITH GROUPED DATA, IT WILL HANDLE INDIVIDUAL OBSERVATIONS BY 
ASSIGNING ONE OBSERVATION PER GROUP. THE PROGRAM ALSO CALCULATES 
EXTENDED GINI MEASURES OF INEQUALITY AND THEIR DECOMPOSITIONS. 
CURRENTLY THE PROGRAM IS DIMENSIONED TO HANDLE UP TO 10 SEPARATE 
VALUES OF THE EXTENDED GINI PARAMETERS. THE DATA INPUT FOR THE 
PROGRAM IS IN TWO SEPARATE INPUT FILES. ONE FILE CONTAINS PROGRAM 
PARAMETERS; THE OTHER CONTAINS THE DATA. BOTH ARE IN FREE FORMAT.
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
REAL VARIABLES
OBS(I) OBSERVATION NUMBER OF GROUP(I)
NUM(I) IS THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN GROUP OBSERVATION I 
ASINC(I,J) IS INCOME FROM SOURCE J OF OBSERVATION I 
ATTOT(I) IS TOTAL INCOME FOR OBSERVATION I
CFSINC(I,J) IS THE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATION I, SOURCE J 
XCFS STORES 1-CFSINC(I,J) TEMPORARILY FOR USE IN EXTENDED GINI 
CALCULATIONS
CFTTOT(I) IS THE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATION I 
FOR TOTAL INCOME
XCFT STORES l-CFTTOT(I) TEMPORARILY FOR USE IN THE EXTENDED GINI 
CALCULATIONS
FREQ(I) IS NUM(I)/NUMTOT 
FMID(I) IS (NUM(I)+l)/(2*NUMTOT)
AFMID IS 
C AFREQ IS
C MA(J) IS AVERAGE INCOME OF SOURCE(J)
C MCATOT IS AVERAGE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF TOTAL INCOME
C MATTOT IS AVERAGE TOTAL INCOME
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C MCA(J) IS AVERAGE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF INCOME SOURCE J
C COV(J) IS COVARIANCE BETWEEN INCOME BY SOURCE AND
C CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY BY SOURCE
C COVT IS COVARIANCE BETWEEN TOTAL INCOME AND CUMULATIVE 
C FREQUENCY OF TOTAL INCOME
C COVST(J) IS COVARIANCE BETWEEN INCOME BY SOURCE AND 
C CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF TOTAL INCOME
C G(J) IS GINI SOURCE J 
C GT IS GINI OF TOTAL INCOME 
C R(J) IS COVST(J)/COV(J)
C SA(J) IS THE SHARE AVERAGE INCOME FOR SOURCE J OF 
C AVERAGE TOTAL INCOME
C RGS(J) IS R(J)*G(J)*SA(J)
C P(J) IS RGS(J)/GT
C E(J) IS P(J)-SA(J)
C NAME(J) IS NAME OF INCOME SOURCE
C INTEGER VARIABLES
C IREADT(J) IS 0 IF READ TOTAL INCOME, 1 IF CALCULATE 
C TOTAL INCOME
C NUMTOT IS TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN ALL I GROUPS
C NSINC IS NUMBER OF INCOME SOURCES
C PARAMETERS
C MAXJ IS MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INCOME SOURCES
C MAXI IS MAXIMUM NUMBER OF OBSERVATION GROUPS
C MAXV IS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EXTENDED GINI PARAMETERS 
C TO BE EVALUATED
C KV(K) IS THE VALUE OF THE KTH EXPANDED GINI PARAMETER 
C NKV IS THE NUMBER OF EXTENDED GINI PARAMETERS READ 
C 
C
C ***********************************************************,>!:'******
C
PARAMETER (MAXJ=5, MAXI=420, INI-10, IN2-11,IOUT-12)
PARAMETER (MAXV=10)
C
REAL*8 OBS(MAXJ),NUM(MAXI),ASINC(MAXI,MAXJ),ATTOT(MAXI),
& CFSINC(MAXI,MAXJ),CFTTOT(MAXI),FREQ(MAXI),FMID(MAXI),
&AFMID,AFREQ,MA(MAXJ),MCATOT,MATTOT,MCA(MAXJ),COV(MAXJ),
& COVT,COVST(MAXJ),G(MAXJ),GT,R(MAXJ),SA(MAXJ).RGS(MAXJ),
& E(MAXJ),P(MAXJ),KV(MAXV),XCFS,XCFT,NUMTOT 
C
INTEGER INUM,NSINC,IREADT,IWRT,NKV 
C
CHARACTER*10 NAME(MAXJ)
C
C ******BEGINNING OF BODY OF PROGRAM********************************** 
C
C READ PROGRAM CONTROL DATA AND SOURCE NAMES 
READ(INI,*) NSINC,IREADT,IWRT, NKV 
READ (INI,*) (KV(III),III=1,NKV)
INUM = INT(NUM(I))
NUM(I) = DBLE(INUM)
DO 999 J = 1,NSINC 
READ(INI,1005) NAME(J)
n 
n 
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999 CONTINUE
READ THE MEMBERS BY GROUP AND INCOME DATA BY SOURCE 
IF (IREADT.EQ.1) THEN
READS MEMBERS BY GROUP, INCOME BY SOURCE, AND CALCULATE 
TOTAL INCOME 
1=1
100 READ(IN2,*,END=200)NUM(I), (ASINC(I,J),J-l.NSINC)
1= 1+1 
GO TO 100 
200 CONTINUE
1= 1-1
DO 215 K=1,I
ATTOT(K)=0.0D0 
DO 215 J=l,NSINC
ATTOT(K)= ATTOT(K)+ASINC(K,J)
215 CONTINUE 
ELSE
READS MEMBERS BY GROUP, INCOME BY SOURCE, AND TOTAL INCOME 
1=1
230 READ(IN2,*,END=250)NUM(I),(ASINC(I,J),J=1,NSINC),
& ATTOT(I)
i=i+i 
GO TO 230 
250 CONTINUE
1=1-1 
END IF
THIS SECTION ADDS A SMALL INCOME TO EACH OBSERVATION 
SO THAT INCOMES ARE NOT EQUAL 
DO 255 K=1,I
XFK = DBLE(K)
ATTOT(K)=ATTOT(K)+0.0000001*XFK 
DO 255 J=l,NSINC
ASINC(K.J) = ASINC(K,J)+0.0000001*XFK 
255 CONTINUE
CALCULATE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCOME UNITS 
NUMTOT=0.0D0 
DO 260 K=1,I
NUMTOT=NUMTOT+NUM(K)
260 CONTINUE
THIS SECTION CALCULATES FMID AND FREQ 
DO 270 K=1,I
FMID(K)=(NUM(K)+l)/(2*NUMTOT)
FREQ(K)=(NUM(K))/NUMTOT 
270 CONTINUE
THIS SECTION CALCULATES CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES FOR 
C INCOME SOURCES
DO 290 J=l,NSINC
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DO 280 Kl-1,1
CFSINC(K1,J)=0.0D0 
AFMID=0.ODO 
AFREQ=0.ODO 
DO 277 K-1,1
IF(ASINC(K1,J) .GE. ASINC(K,J)) THEN
CFSINC(K1,J)=CFSINC(K1,J)-AFMID+AFREQ+FMID(K)
AFMID = FMID(K)
AFREQ - FREQ(K)
END IF
277 CONTINUE
280 CONTINUE 
290 CONTINUE 
C
C CALCULATE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES FOR TOTAL INCOME 
DO 300 Kl=l,I
CFTTOT(Kl) = 0.0D0 
AFMID = 0.0D0 
AFREQ =0.ODO 
DO 310 K=1,I
IF(ATT0T(K1) .GE. ATTOT(K)) THEN
CFTTOT(K1)=CFTT0T(K1)-AFMID+AFREQ+FMID(K)
AFMID = FMID(K)
AFREQ = FREQ(K)
END IF
310 CONTINUE 
300 CONTINUE 
C
C WRITE OUT INCOME BY SOURCE AND CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES 
IF (IWRT .NE. 0) THEN 
KK=IWRT 
ELSE 
KK=I 
END IF
PP=(NSINC+l)/3 
NPP=(INT(PP))+l 
DO 320 Jl=l,NPP
IF (NVE .EQ. NSINC) GO TO 327
NVS-((J1-1)*3)+1
NVE= MIN((J1*3).NSINC)
WRITE(IOUT,1000)(NAME(JJ),NAME(JJ),JJ=NVS,NVE)
DO 325 K=1,KK
WRITE(IOUT,4000)(ASINC(K,JJ),CFSINC(K,JJ),JJ=NVS,NVE)
325 CONTINUE 
327 CONTINUE
320 CONTINUE
WRITE(IOUT,2000)
DO 326 K=1,KK
WRITE(IOUT,5000) ATTOT(K),CFTTOT(K),NUM(K)
326 CONTINUE 
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES AVERAGE INCOMES BY SOURCE AND 
C AVERAGE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES FOR USE IN COVARIANCE 
C CALCULATIONS
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DO 350 J-l,NSINC 
MA(J) = 0.0D0 
MCA(J) = 0.0D0 
350 CONTINUE
MCATOT - 0.0D0
MATTOT - 0.0D0
DO 360 J—1,NSINC 
DO 365 K-1,I
MA(J)=MA(J)+ASINC(K,J)*FREQ(K)
MCA(J)=MCA(J)+CFSINC(K,J)*FREQ(K)
365 CONTINUE
360 CONTINUE.
DO 370 K—1,I
MATTOT-MATTOT+ATTOT(K)*FREQ(K)
MCATOT=MCATOT+CFTTOT(K)*FREQ(K)
370 CONTINUE
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES THE COVARIANCES BETWEEN INCOME BY 
C SOURCE AND THE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF TOTAL INCOME 
DO 400 J-l,NSINC 
COV(J)=0.0D0 
COVST(J) = 0.0D0 
400 CONTINUE
COVT = 0.0D0 
DO 410 J-l,NSINC 
DO 405 K=1,I
COV(J)=COV(J)+(ASINC(K,J)-MA(J))*(CFSINC(K,J)
& -MCA(J))*FREQ(K)
COVST(J)=COVST(J)+(ASINC(K,J)-MA(J))*(CFTTOT(K)
& -MCATOT)*FREQ(K)
405 CONTINUE
410 CONTINUE
DO 415 K—1,I
COVT=COVT+(ATTOT(K)-MATOT)*(CFTTOT(K)-MCATOT)*FREQ(K) 
415 CONTINUE 
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES GINIS BY SOURCE 
C AND RATIOS OF COVARIANCES 
DO 430 J-l,NSINC
G(J)=2*COV(J)/MA(J)
R(J)=COVST(J)/COV(J)
430 CONTINUE
GT-2*COVT/MATTOT •
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES INCOME SHARES BY SOURCE 
DO 435 J-l,NSINC
SA(J)=MA(J)/MATTOT 
435 CONTINUE 
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES RGS.THE PROPORTIONS AND THE 
C ELASTICITIES OF TOTAL INCOME INEQUALITY BY SOURCE 
DO 450 J-l,NSINC
RG S(J)—R(J)*G(J)*SA(J)
P(J)-RGS(J)/GT
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E(J)=P(J)-SA(J)
450 CONTINUE 
C
C THIS SECTION WRITES OUT THE RESULTS FOR THE CONVENTIONAL GINI 
C
C THIS SUBSECTION PRINTS MEANS, SHARES AND COVARIANCES 
WRITE(IOUT,7000)
DO 460 J=1,NSINC
WRITE(IOUT,8000) NAME(J),MA(J),SA(J),COV(J)
460 CONTINUE
WRITE(IOUT,7500)
DO 470 J=l,NSINC .
WRITE(IOUT,8500) NAME(J),G(J),R(J),RGS(J),P(J),E(J)
470 CONTINUE
WRITE(IOUT,8600)GT
C THIS SECTION RECALCULATES CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
C FOR SOURCES OF INCOME AND TOTAL INCOME FOR USE IN THE EXTENDED 
C GINI
IF (NKV .NE. 0) THEN 
■ WRITE (IOUT,8550) NKV
DO 504 II1=1,NKV
WRITE (IOUT,8560) III,KV(III)
504 CONTINUE
DO 505 II1=1,NKV 
DO 520 J=l,NSINC 
DO 530 K=1,I
C XCFS = 1.0D0 - CFSINC(K,J)
C XCFT = 1.0D0 - CFTTOT(K)
IF ( (1.0D0-CFSINC(K,J)) .LT. 0.0D0) THEN 
WRITE (IOUT,9998) J,K,CFSINC(K,J)
9998 FORMAT (IX,'1-CFSINC(K,J) IS LESS THAN 0.0',215,D20.5) 
CFSINC(K,J) = 1.0D0 
END IF 
C
C PRINTS OUT A MESSAGE AND SETS (1 - CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY) TO 0.0 
C IF IT IS A SMALL NEGATIVE NUMBER
IF ( (1.0D0-CFTTOT(K)) .LT. 0.0D0) THEN 
WRITE (IOUT,9999) J,K,CFTTOT(K)
CFTTOT(K) = 1.0D0 
END IF
C CFSINC(K,J)=(XCFS)**((KV(III)-1.0D0))
C CFTTOT(K)=(XCFT)**((KV(III)-1.0D0))
530 CONTINUE
520 CONTINUE
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES AVERAGE INCOME BY SOURCE AND ONE MINUS 
C THE CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY ALL TO THE KV(III)-1 POWER FOR USE IN 
C COVARIANCE CALCULATIONS FOR THE EXTENDED GINI 
DO 540 J=l,NSINC 
MCA(J) = 0.0D0 
540 CONTINUE
MCATOT = 0.0D0 
DO 550 J=l,NSINC 
DO 560 K=1,I
XCFS=(1.0D0-CFSINC(K,J))**(KV(III) -1)
o 
o
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MCA(J)=MCA(J)+XCFS*FREQ(K)
560 CONTINUE
550 CONTINUE
DO 570 K-1,1
XCFT=(1.ODO-CFTTOT(K))**(KV(III)-1) 
MCATOT=MCATOT+XCFT*FREQ(K)
570 CONTINUE
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES COVARIANCES FOR THE EXTENDED GINI 
DO 580 J-l,NSINC 
COV(J)=O.ODO 
COVST(J)=O.ODO 
580 CONTINUE
COVT=0.ODO 
DO 590 J-l,NSINC 
DO 600 K=1,I
XCFS=(1.0D0-CFSINC(K,J))**(KV(III)-1) 
XCFT=(1.ODO-CFTTOT(K))**(KV(III)-l) 
C0V(J)=C0V(J)+(ASINC(K,J)- 
& MA(J))*(XCFS-MCA(J))*FREQ(K)
COVST(J)=COVST(J)+(ASINC(K,J)- 
& MA(J))*(XCFT-MCATOT)*FREQ(K)
600 CONTINUE
590 CONTINUE
DO 610 K=1,I
XCFT=(1.ODO-CFTTOT(K))**(KV(III)-l) 
COVT=COVT+(ATTOT(K)-
& MATTOT)*(XCFT-MCATOT)*FREQ(K)
610 CONTINUE
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES THE VALUE OF EXTENDED GINIS BY SOURCE 
C AND RATIOS OF COVARIANCES FOR EXTENDED GINI DECOMPOSITION 
DO 620 J=1,NSINC
G(J)=(-KV(III))*C0V(J)/MA(J)
R(J)=C0VST(J)/COV(J)
620 CONTINUE
GT=(-KV(III))*C0VT/MATTOT
THIS SECTION CALCULATES INCOME SHARES BY SOURCE 
DO 625 J=l,NSINC
SA(J)=MA(J)/MATTOT 
625 CONTINUE
C
C THIS SECTION CALCULATES R,G,S, THE PROPORTIONS, AND THE 
C ELASTICITIES OF TOTAL INCOME INEQUALITY BY SOURCE FOR THE 
C EXTENDED GINI
DO 630 J-l,NSINC
RGS(J)=R(J)*G(J)*SA(J)
P(J)=RGS(J)/GT
E(J)=P(J)-SA(J)
630 CONTINUE
C
C THIS SECTION WRITES OUT EXTENDED GINI RESULTS, MEANS, SHARES 
C AND COVARIANCES
WRITE (IOUT, 8700) KV(III)
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WRITE (IOUT,7000)
DO 640 J—1,NSINC
WRITE (IOUT,8000) NAME(J),MA(J),SA(J),COV(J)
640 CONTINUE
WRITE (IOUT,7500)
DO 650 J=1,NSINC
WRITE (IOUT,8500) NAME(J),G(J),R(J),RGS(J),P(J),E(J) 
650 CONTINUE
WRITE (IOUT,8600) GT 
505 CONTINUE
END IF
1000 FORMAT(IX,/,2X,'INCOME BY: CUMFREQS: INCOME BY: ',
& ' CUMFREQS: INCOME BY: CUMFREQS: ' ,/,
& 2XA10, 2X,A10, 2X,A10, 2X,A10, 2X,A10, 2X,A10,/ )
1005 FORMAT(A10)
2000 FORMAT(IX,/,2X,' TOT. INCOME CUMFREQ NUMBER',/)
4000 FORMAT(3(F12.2,F12.5))
5000 FORMAT (2X,F12.2,F12.5,F12.2)
7000 FORMAT(IX,'NAME MEAN INCOME INCOME SHARE',
& ' COVARIANCE',/)
7500 FORMAT(2X,'NAME GINI RATIO COVRATIO RSG',
& ' PROPOR ELASTICITY',/)
8000 FORMAT(A10.3F15.6)
8600 FORMAT(2X,'TOTAL ',F10.6,/)
8500 FORMAT(A10,5F10.6)
8550 FORMAT (IX,'NUMBER OF EXTENDED GINI PARAMETERS = ',13,/)
8560 FORMAT (IX,'ENTENDED GINI PARAMETER NO.',13,' = '.F6.3,/)
8700 FORMAT(IX,'EXTENDED GINI WEIGHT',F10.6,/)
9999 FORMAT (IX,'l-CFTTOT(K) IS LESS THAN 0.0',215,D20.5)
STOP
END
APPENDIX C
RESULTS FROM THE EXTENDED GINI DECOMPOSITION
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Table C-l. Proportional Contribution of One Income Source to the Inequality
of Another Income Source for U.S. Households, 1984 (v=1.5)
_______________________Income Source_____________________
Income Earned Property Transfer Other Money Non-Money Total
Source® Income Income Income
Earned 1.000 0.914
Property 1.000 0.085
Transfer -0.010
SSI 0.333 (-0.003)b
AFDC 0.468 (-0.005)
Other 0.199 (-0.001)
Other Money 0.017
Soc 0.435 (-0.024)
Unemploy 0.024 (-0.001)
Vet 0.022 (-0.000)
Other 0.519 ( 0.042)
Non-money -0.006
F. Stamps 0.778 (-0.005)
Other 0.222 (-0.001)
aSee table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11). The proportional changes in inequality given in this table 
are calculated according to equation (6), with the extended values of R^v) 
and G^v) substituted for and when the value of v is not equal to 
2.0. The proportional changes for total income can be calculated from the 
individual proportions for the components using the second-level 
decomposition described in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the proportional contributions of each
corresponding income source. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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Table C-2. Propoftional Contribution of One Income Source to the Inequality
of Another Income Source for U.S. Households, 1984 (v—5.0)
Income Source
Income
Source®
Earned Property Transfer Other Money
Income
Non-Money 
Income
Total
Income
Earned 1.000 0.919
Property 1.000 0.071
Transfer -0.016
SSI 0.339 (-0.006)b
AFDC 0.457 (-0.007)
Other 0.204 (-0.003)
Other Money 0.035
Soc 0.495 (-0.017)
Unemploy 0.035 ( 0.001)
Vet 0.024 ( 0.000)
Other 0.446 ( 0.052)
Non-money ' -0.010
F. Stamps 0.768 (-0.008)
Other 0.232 (-0.002)
“See table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11). The proportional changes in inequality given in this table 
are calculated according to equation (6), with the extended values of R^(v) 
and G^(v) substituted for and when the value of v is not equal to 
2.0. The proportional changes for total income can be calculated from the 
individual proportions for the components using the second-level decomp­
osition described in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the proportional contributions of each
corresponding income source. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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Table C-3. Elasticity of One Income Source to the Inequality of Another
Income Source for U.S. Households, 1984 (v—1.5)
______________________Income Source______________________
Income Earned Property Transfer Other Money Non-Money Total
Source® Income Income Income
Earned 0 0.138
Property 0 0.018
Transfer -0.021
SSI -0.006 (-0.007)b
AFDC 0.011 (-0.010)
Other -0.005 (-0.004)
Other Money -0.124
Soc -0.060 (-0.094)
Unemploy -0.011 (-0.006)
Vet -0.007 (-0.004)
Other 0.078 (-0.020)
Non-money -0.011
F. Stamps 0.010 (-0.009)
Other -0.010 (-0.002)
“See table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11). The elasticities of inequality in the table are calculated 
according to equation (7), with the extended values of R^(v) and G^(v) 
substituted for R^ and when the value of v is not equal to 2.0. The 
elasticities for total income can be generated from the elasticities of 
the individual components using the second-level decomposition described 
in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the elasticities of each of the
corresponding income sources. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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Table C-4. Elasticity of One Income Source to the Inequality of Another
Income Source for U.S. Households, 1984 (v-5.0)
Income Source
Income
Source®
Earned Property Transfer Other Money
Income
Non-Money 
Income
Total
Income
Earned 0 0.144
Property 0 0.004
Transfer -0.027
SSI -0.000 (-0.010)b
AFDC -0.000 (-0.012)
Other -0.000 (-0.005)
Other Money -0.105
Soc -0.000 (-0.087)
Unemploy -0.000 (-0.004)
Vet -0.004 (-0.004)
Other 0.005 (-0.010)
Non-money -0.015
F. Stamps 0.000 (-0.012)
Other -0.000 (-0.003)
“See table 1 for definitions of the sources of income. The parameter 
v is the value of the extended Gini parameter from equations (7) 
through (11). The elasticities of inequality in the table are calculated 
according to equation (7), with the extended values of R^(v) and G^(v) 
substituted for and when the value of v is not equal to 2.0. The 
elasticities for total income can be generated from the elasticities of 
the individual components using the second-level decomposition described 
in equations (12) through (15).
bThe numbers in parentheses add to the elasticities of each of the
corresponding income sources. The detail may not add due to rounding.
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